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Abstract
In this paper we report the results of a series of studies of knowledge acquisition in observational
astronomy. The results of these studies have shown that children construct naive concepts of the earth,
moon, sun and stars on the basis of their everyday experience. These concepts are based on certain
ontological beliefs, such as the ground is flat, that the earth has an end, and that stars are small objects.
Naive concepts are very different from the currently accepted scientific views to which children are
instructed in the schools. In order to change their naive concepts to the currently accepted ones
children must replace their ontological beliefs with a different explanatory framework. Our
preliminary investigations of astronomy instruction and of the astronomy units in four widely used
science series indicate that children are not provided with adequate explanations of the scientific views
they need to acquire and, as a result, that they find it difficult to restructure their naive conceptions.
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KNOWLEDGE RESTRUCTURING AND SCIENCE INSTRUCTION
One of the most interesting results of recent work in cognitive science and science education has been
the realization that science-naive individuals have an understanding of the natural world which is based
on their interpretation of everyday experience. This naive knowledge is usually quite different from the
scientific knowledge which is expected from literate adults in our society. In the process of learning
science students must change their naive knowledge to make it conform to the currently accepted
scientific knowledge. The process of conceptual change can be a rather lengthy and difficult one
because naive ideas appear to be quite robust and difficult to extinguish (e.g., diSessa, 1982; Driver &
Easley, 1978; Novak, 1977; Osborne & Wittrock, 1983; White, 1983).
There is currently a lot of debate about how it is best to characterize the nature of naive knowledge and
the mechanisms thereby which it can be modified (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987). Some researchers
believe that novices' ideas can be conceptualized as consisting of a coherent and systematic set of ideas
which have a status similar to that of a scientific theory. In some cases these ideas are found to
resemble earlier theories in the history of science (McCloskey, 1983; Wiser & Carey, 1983). Other
researchers think that naive physics consists of a fragmented collection of ideas which are loosely
connected and do not have the systematicity that one attributes to a scientific theory (diSessa, 1985).
Depending on one's beliefs about the nature of naive knowledge different instructional implications are
drawn. Researchers who view novices as having relatively well organized and consistent naive theories
think that the process of science learning requires a change in theory similar in some respects to the
kind of theory change observed in the history of science (Hanson, 1958; Kuhn, 1962; 1970). Although
the mechanisms for achieving this kind of theory change are not yet known, most of these researchers
believe that it is necessary to confront the novice students with enough evidence to make them realize
the limitations of their theories and change them (Anderson, 1977; Collins, 1986; McCloskey, 1983;
Nussbaum & Novick, 1982).
On the contrary, diSessa (1988) thinks that a one-by-one attack of the knowledge fragments that
constitute naive physics is a hopeless task. He suggests that what is needed is to use these fragments to
develop the scientific understanding that a science-naive individual lacks. diSessa proposes developing
ways to collect and unify naive knowledge through microworlds.
Advances in science instruction require some clarification of these conceptual issues. In this paper we
present an intermediate position based on our research of the acquisition of knowledge in astronomy
and draw the implications of this position for instruction.
Theoretical Framework
Several studies of children's notions of the earth's shape have shown that children start with the notion
that the earth is flat and that in the process of making the shift from a flat to a round earth concept
form various misconceptions regarding the earth's shape (e.g., Nussbaum, 1979; Nussbaum & Novak,
1976; Sneider & Pulos, 1983). However provocative, these empirical studies have not provided us with
information regarding the systematicity, consistency and robustness of children's misconceptions about
the earth's shape. In our experiments we have tried to answer some of these questions.
We have conducted a series of experiments investigating children's and adults' knowledge of the
domain of astronomy. These studies have involved preschool, elementary, and high school children,
college undergraduates and adult illiterates (Vosniadou, 1987; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987; Vosniadou
& Brewer, submitted). In addition to studies conducted in the United States, we have collected data
from children and adults in India (Samarapungavan & Vosniadou, submitted), Samoa (Brewer,
Hendrich, & Vosniadou, submitted), and Greece (Vosniadou & Brewer, in press). These studies have
provided us with specific information about children's and adults' knowledge about the shape,
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movement, temperature, composition, relative size and relative location of the earth, the sun, the moon
and the stars, as well as explanations of phenomena like the day/night cycle, the seasons, the phases of
the moon, and the eclipses of the sun and the moon.
Our studies have shown that children construct a conceptual understanding of the physical world which
becomes continuously modified with exposure to adult ideas. We tried to obtain information about this
conceptual understanding through an examination of children's responses to our questions. We have
hypothesized that in order to answer these questions children use their conceptual knowledge to form a
mental model. A mental model is a special kind of mental representation whose structure is analogous
to the structure of the states of affairs (perceived or conceived) that it represents (Johnson-Laird, 1983;
Collins & Stevens, 1984). For that reason, mental models can provide important information about the
nature of the conceptual structure (Vosniadou & Brewer, submitted).
In this research we tried to understand first the kinds of mental models the children construct to
answer our individual questions, and second to determine whether these mental models were derived
from a consistent underlying concept. We then tried to use this information to draw inferences about
the nature and development of children's conceptual knowledge.
Children's Conceptual Knowledge in the Domain of Observational Astronomy
Our experiments have shown that children construct a number of different concepts of the earth's
shape, size, and location of a phenomena like the day/night cycle. For example, in the case of the
shape of the earth we have identified six different kinds of concepts held by elementary school children
(Vosniadou & Brewer, submitted). As can be seen in Table 1, only 2 out of 20 first grade children and
10 out of 20 fifth grade children really believe that the earth is a round sphere. Some children believe
that the earth is round but that we live on flat pieces of land (inside-the-sphere concept), while others
think that we live on the flat top of a truncated sphere or on the top of a thick pancake (questionable
sphere concept). Quite a few of the first grade children in our sample believed that there are two
earths, a flat one on which people live and a round one which is up in the sky!
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
Elementary school children also provide one of a number of different explanations of the day/night
cycle (see Table 2). Some children believe that the change from day to night is caused because the sun
moves down and the moon moves up, while others think that clouds move in front of the sun and block
it. One interesting explanation was held by children who knew that the earth rotates around its axis but
attributed the day/night cycle to the presence of the moon. These children thought that the moon is
fixed in some place in the sky where it is always night; as the earth rotates our part of the earth
eventually comes to face the moon and as a result to bring the night.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
Children's beliefs were identified from their responses not to one but to many questions tapping each
problem. Crucial to our approach was the distinction between factual, explanatory, and generative
questions. Factual questions were designed to test the child's exposure to certain important facts (e.g.,
"What is the shape of the earth?"). Explanation questions were designed to reveal the explanatory
framework children used to explain those facts (e.g., "How do you know that the earth is round when
the earth around us appears to be flat?"). Generative questions were designed to capture the mental
models children used to answer questions to which they had not been previously exposed (e.g., "If you
were to walk for many days would you ever reach the edge of the earth?"). Children's responses to
these questions revealed the extent to which children had incorporated the information coming from
adults into their underlying conceptual structures. Follow-up questions and confrontation questions
were also used throughout the interview to try to understand children's beliefs.
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Often, we asked additional questions at the end of the interview in an effort to obtain as accurate a
picture of children's concept of the earth as possible. Here is an example of such an exchange.
E: Why does the earth look flat in this picture, but round in yours? (Experimenter shows
child the picture of a house on what appears to be a flat piece of land.)
C: Because we are on the earth and then the earth is all around us so it looks like the earth is
flat to us, but it is really round.
E: But how come it looks flat to us?
C: Because we are inside of the earth.
E: Is the earth round like a ball or round like a thick pancake?
C: Round like a ball.
E: So when you say we are inside the earth, what do you mean? Deep inside the ball?
C: Well, like we're right inside the ball. Kind of like in the middle of it. I'd say we were just
in the middle of the earth.
E: If we had a ball here, it wouldn't be deep in the middle, it would be on the outside of it?
C: We would be inside of it.
E: So we are inside the ball. Can we see inside that round ball?
C: No. Well, we can see inside of it, we just can't see the round ball.
Children gave a variety of responses to these questions. Some said that the shape of the earth is a
"rectangle," others a "circle," others "round." Some said that there is an end to the earth, others that
there is no end, and others that there is an end but that it cannot be reached because it is too high up.
Some children said that you look "down" to see the earth, some that you look "up." In many cases
children's responses seemed to be internally inconsistent. For example, the same children who said
that the earth is round also claimed that the earth has an end and that people can fall down from that
end.
We tried to determine whether children's responses to our questions could be explained if we assumed
that the children were consistent in their use of the same concept. To do that we derived from our data
as well as from previous research in this area (e.g., Nussbaum & Novak, 1976; Nussbaum, 1979;
Sneider & Poulos, 1983) a number of possible concepts for each notion investigated. Then, for each
question investigating a given notion we generated the answers expected if the children had that
concept. For example, we reasoned that if the children believed that the earth is a round sphere, they
should say that the earth's shape is "round," that you look "down" to see the earth, that there is no edge
to the earth, and that if you were to walk for many days in a straight line you would eventually come
back to where you started.
Once the pattern of responses for each concept was determined, we checked children's responses to
the relevant questions to see if they agreed with the expected ones. Placement in one of the concepts
required no more than one deviation from the expected pattern and only if this deviation occurred in a
non-defining item for that category. For example, a child who said that there is an end to the earth
could not be assumed to be making consistent use of a spherical earth concept, even in those cases
where this response was the child's only deviation from a spherical earth concept response pattern. On
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the other hand, the response "circle" to the question "What is the shape of the earth?" was considered
an acceptable deviation for a child whose responses agreed in all other respects with the spherical earth
concept, because it could be caused by a linguistic mismapping (the child may have used the word
"circle" to mean "round").
We were able to determine that children used certain concepts consistently for about 80 to 85% of the
cases for each concept investigated. Some children had mixed concepts and for some no toncept could
be identified. On the whole, however, our results suggested that there was a relatively high degree of
internal consistency in children's ideas at the level of the individual notions investigated (e.g., shape,
movement, size, and location of the earth, sun, moon, and stars, etc.).
Once these concepts were identified, we realized that they could be grouped in three distinct
categories: Naive, assimilatory and scientific. The defining characteristic of naive concepts is that they
require as little deviation as possible from the natural world as is phenomenally experienced. They
show no influence from adult scientific concepts. These concepts can be generated from children's
perceptual experience as this experience is constrained by the human perceptual apparatus. For
example, young children seem to believe that the earth is shaped like a rectangle or like a square and
that it does not move, that the day/night cycle is caused by the movement of the sun or by the
movement of the clouds blocking the sun, that stars are small objects, and that things fall down when
you drop them.
Scientific concepts are held by educated adults in our society, they are the concepts that agree with
current scientific views. Assimilatory concepts show a combination of naive and scientific views, such
as the view that the earth is round like a pancake, or that we live inside the spherical earth. Another
example of an assimilatory concept is the view that night is caused by the earth's axis rotation because
as the earth turns our side of the earth comes to face the stationary moon. Also, the view that the stars
take their light from the sun, just like the moon does. What all of these concepts have in common is an
attempt to reconcile adult scientific views with naive concepts of the earth, the sun, the moon and the
stars.
The presence of assimilatory concepts indicates that the process of changing a naive concept to a
scientific one does not involve a sudden and dramatic restructuring but that it is slow and gradual. In
addition, assimilatory concepts provide interesting information about the nature of the naive concepts
from which they are formed. More specifically, they suggest that naive models are constructed out of a
set of smaller and more fundamental units of naive knowledge, based on children's ontological beliefs.
Thus, the naive model of the flat earth is based on the ontological beliefs (among others) that the
ground is straight, that there is an end to the earth, that things fall down when you drop them, that the
sky is located above the earth, that there is ground or water all the way down to the end of the earth,
etc. (See Vosniadou & Brewer, submitted, for a more extensive discussion of this issue.)
In forming assimilatory concepts, children change their naive concepts in a way that allows them to
retain all or some of their ontological beliefs, without contradicting adult teachings. For example, the
children who change their naive concept of a rectangular earth to the assimilatory concept of a disc
earth have retained almost all of their ontological beliefs that gave rise to the naive concept. These
children answer our questions in a way that shows that they still believe that the earth is flat, that it has
an end, that there is ground all the way down and that the sky is above the earth. The only belief they
have changed is that the edges of the earth consist of straight lines and thus that the earth is shaped like
a rectangle or like a square.
A detailed examination of children's responses revealed that there is a progression of more and more
advanced assimilatory concepts depending on how many ontological beliefs children have given up.
For example, the inside the earth view is a more advanced assimilatory concept of the earth's shape
than the disc concept. The children who hold the inside the sphere concept have given up on their
ontological belief that the earth is flat, that there is ground all the way down, and that the sky is only on
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top of the earth. These children conceptualize the earth as a sphere suspended in space but still believe
that people live on flat ground inside the earth, and that things fall downward (and therefore people
cannot live at the bottom of the earth). Similarly, the children who think that night is caused because
the earth's axis rotation allows our side of the earth to face the stationary moon, have not yet given up
on their ontological belief that night is located in some place in the sky where the moon is, although
they have changed their original ontological beliefs that the moon moves up/down and that the earth
does not move.
The formation of assimilatory concepts seems to be reinforced by the nature of science instruction.
Children are almost never told why the earth that appears to everyone to be flat is really a round
sphere, or how it is possible for the earth to move around itself when we do not feel it. When
counterintuitive information is presented as a fact, rather than as a theory which needs to be further
explained, the preconditions for a misconception are formed.
In order to understand how misconceptions are formed, it is necessary to also assume that children
consider their ontological beliefs to be unquestionable truths about the way the world is, truths that are
obvious to everyone. In this respect, ontological beliefs are not like a hypothesis or an assumption in a
scientific theory. Children seem to consider these truths to be obvious to adults, something that
explains why they do not question the adults about the truth of their statements regarding the shape,
movement, size, etc. of the earth that run counter to their naive concepts as much as we would expect
them to.
We think that the genesis of a misconception can be conceptualized in the following way. When
children with a naive concept of a flat and stationary earth read in a book or hear from an adult that
the earth is "round like a ball," they do not want to believe that the adult is wrong but cannot reconcile
this information with their ontological belief of a flat earth. Because they consider this ontological
belief to be such an obvious truth about the world known to adults, they think that they have
misunderstood what the adult means by these statements. In trying to interpret adult information in a
way that does not contradict their ontological beliefs, children construct assimilatory concepts or
remain confused.
Implications for Instruction
Our work suggests that in order for instruction to be successful in moving children from their naive
concepts to current scientific concepts it must be based on a thorough understanding of children's
ontological beliefs as well as on an understanding of the interdependencies among the various concepts
that comprise a domain in which knowledge is to be acquired.
Knowledge of children's ontological beliefs is necessary because different instructional methods may
have to be employed when the knowledge acquisition process requires changing these beliefs than
when it does not. For example, one would expect preschool children to understand that the sun is
round by simply being told so (young children think that the sun is circular but flat). We know,
however, that telling children that the earth is round like a ball does not result in an immediate
understanding of the earth's shape. In those cases where an adult scientific concept contradicts
children's ontological beliefs, these contradictions must be pointed out by the adult. In addition, the
children must be provided with persuasive reasons for questioning their beliefs and with a different
explanatory framework to replace them. The success of instruction will depend on how well basic
research has done the job of uncovering all of the beliefs that cause misconceptions and in discovering
the appropriate instructional methods for changing them.
Finally, instruction must be also based on knowledge of the interdependencies among concepts that
comprise a domain because these interdependencies determine to a large extent the order of
acquisition of these concepts. We believe that instruction that utilizes the information about the order
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of acquisition of the concepts that comprise a given domain will be much more effective than
instruction which does not.
A limited look at some astronomy instruction in local schools and a detailed examination of the
astronomy units in four leading science series that we have recently undertaken have revealed problems
in both areas. For example, in one series examined, the authors organized the material to be acquired
around scientific information about the moon, the sun, and the earth. Therefore, they included a unit
on the moon at grade 1 which takes the children from a description of the size and shape of the moon
to an explanation of the moon's phases! Our studies of high school students have shown that most 10th
and 11th grade children cannot explain phenomena such as the phases of the moon, the eclipses of the
moon and the sun or even the seasons.
As expected, no explanations were provided of concepts like the shape, movement, size and location of
the earth. In all cases, the children were simply told that "the earth is like a globe" and that "it rotates
around its axis," that it is smaller than the sun, and so on. Whenever explanations were provided, they
were incomplete and inadequate both because they did not address all of the underlying ontological
beliefs that can give rise to misconceptions and because they did not take into consideration the order
of acquisition of conceptual knowledge in this domain.
In one experiment we have recently conducted we tested third graders' understanding of the day/night
cycle before and immediately after they read a two-page text from a leading science series on the
day/night cycle written for their grade level. The results were rather revealing. Out of the 23 children
investigated, 6 provided adequate explanations of the day/night cycle (e.g., in terms of the axis rotation
of the earth) before they read the text and 5 after they read it! These numbers included two children
who became confused after reading the text and thought that the day/night cycle is caused by the
earth's revolution around the sun, rather than by its axis rotation and one child who actually changed
from a model of a moving sun and moon to that of a moving earth.
There were two main reasons for children's failures to understand the text. First, many of the third-
grade children did not have an adequate earth shape concept in the first place and as a result they
could not understand the information about the earth's movement or could not see how this movement
could explain the day/night cycle. For example, a child with a disc concept of the earth's shape had
interpreted the information about the earth's axis rotation to mean that the pancake earth turns
around. This movement cannot, however, explain the day/night cycle and the child was obviously
confused.
Second, many children who understood how the earth moves formed the assimilatory concept
previously mentioned according to which the earth's axis rotation causes the earth to face the moon
and thus to cause the night. These children said that the moon does not move, and answered our
generative question "What changes do we need to make to have day time all the time?" by saying that
"We must get rid of the moon!" Needless to say, an adequate explanation of the day/night cycle must
include not only information about the shape and movement of the earth, but also about the
movement, shape, size, location and light of the sun, the moon, and the stars.
We are currently in the process of designing such an instructional unit paying particular attention to the
sequence of concepts to be explicated and the nature of the proposed explanations for changing the
ontological beliefs associated with each concept.
Conclusions
We have argued that our investigations of the process of knowledge acquisition in the domain of
astronomy have shown that children construct naive concepts of the observed world which require as
little deviation from the world as phenomenally experienced as possible. These naive models are based
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on a smaller set of ontological beliefs, such as that stars are small objects, that things fall down when
you drop them, that light is perceived directly, and that matter is solid.
Our research has shown that conceptual change will not necessarily come by attacking children's naive
or assimilatory concepts. Such concepts are easy to change. What is difficult to change are the
ontological beliefs that give rise to them. While children should be made aware of these beliefs and the
internal contradictions among them, this will not by itself bring about the desired conceptual change
either. Children must be provided with a different explanatory framework to replace the one they
currently have and, furthermore, this should be done in a way that does not violate the relational
structure of the domain in which knowledge is to be acquired and the interdependencies among the
concepts that comprise it. This does not appear to be the kind of instruction elementary school
children in the United States currently receive. Our preliminary investigations of astronomy instruction
and the astronomy units in four leading science series indicate that children are not provided with
adequate explanations of the concepts to be acquired and that instruction is not sensitive to the order
of acquisition of these concepts.
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Table 1
Frequency of Children's Concepts of the Earth's Shape as a Function of Grade
Grade
Earth Shape
Concepts 1 3 5 TOTAL
1. Sphere
2. Questionable
Sphere
3. Inside-the-
Sphere
4. Disc
5. Dual Earth
6. Flat (Rectangle)
7. Mixed
2
1
2
0
7
1
7
8
3
4
1
2
0
2
10
6
20
10
10
TOTAL 20 20 20 60
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Table 2
Frequency of Explanations of the Day/Night Cycle as a Function of Grade
Explanations of Grade
the Day/Night Cycle 1 3 5 TOTAL
1. Earth rotates around
its axis
2. Sun moves up/down
and trades place with
moon
3. Something blocks the
sun
4. Earth rotates around
its axis and sun and
moon fixed
5. Mixed: Earth rotates
and sun moves and
clouds block sun
6. Sun revolves around
Earth
7. Earth revolves around
sun
8. Earth goes in orbit
9. No explanation
10. Undetermined
TOTAL 20 20 20 60
2 12
13
18
0 16
0
3
2
1
0 2
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